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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 
14749 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil rights action filed by appellant, 
Andrew G. Kish, pro se, in the Third District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
against personnel of the Utah Division of Corrections for 
alleged denial of appellant's civil rights at the Utah State 
Prison. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted defendant-respondents1 
motion to dismiss which challenged the jurisdiction of a 
state district court to entertain federal civil rights actions 
ANDREW G. KISH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs~ 
ERNEST D. WRIGHT, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
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filed under 42 U.S.C. § 19 8 3, and in the alternative 
alleged that state district courts could, in their dis-
cretion, refuse to take jurisdiction of such federal 
actions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request that the order granting 
their motion to dismiss be affirmed, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 23, 1975, appellant, Andrew G. 
Kish, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, filed a pro se 
complaint in the Third District Court alleging that 
respondents (personnel of the Utah Division of Corrections 
and Utah State Prison) had violated his civil rights during 
his incarceration in the prison by denying him "appropriate" 
clothing, yard privileges, interviews with the warden or 
deputy warden, proper food, and indigent funds. He brought 
his action under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. Counsel for appellant was appointed by the lower 
court on March 16, 19 76. Respondents filed a motion to 
dismiss the action and accompanying memorandum alleging that 
proper jurisdiction over federal claims arising under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 was in the federal courts, not the state 
courts, and, in the alternative, that state courts could, 
-2-
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in their discretion, refuse to take jurisdiction of such 
actions. On April 20, 1976, a hearing on respondents1 
motion was held before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snowr 
who granted the motion on May 19, 1976, and dismissed the 
case. From that decision, appellant appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED RESPONDENTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS IN THAT STATE DISTRICT COURTS ARE NOT 
THE PROPER FORUM FOR AND DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER 
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS FILED UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STATE COURTS ARE NOT COMPELLED TO 
TAKE JURISDICTION OVER SUCH FEDERAL ACTIONS, AND MAY, IN 
THEIR DISCRETION, REFUSE TO DO SO. 
The issues presented in this appeal are of 
first impression in the State of Utah, and it is significant 
to note that in over forty states these issues have not 
arisen. Respondents suggest the explanation for this is 
the continuing practice in the great majori'ty of states 
to bring civil rights actions, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only 
in federal district courts. The courts of the few jurisdic-
tions which have addressed the matter are divided on the 
issues. Respondents submit that persuasive legal, historical 
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and practical analyses of those jurisdictions which oppose 
bringing such federal actions in state courts is the 
sounder view appropriately adopted by Judge Snow when he 
granted respondents1 motion to dismiss. 
The statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
provides: 
"Every person who under color 
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or 
Territory, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress." 
The accompanying jurisdictional provision is 28 U.S.C. § 
1343, which states: 
"The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action authorized by law to 
be commenced by any person." 
The United States Supreme Court traced the 
Congressional history of the federal civil rights statutes 
in detail in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). It 
should be noted that Monroe did not focus on the issue of 
whether actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could be brought 
in state district courts. In fact, the action in Monroe 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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was brought in a federal district court, and the sole issue 
was whether Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Acts, 
intended to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitu-
tional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's 
abuse of his position. Id., at 172. The Court then examined 
the history of the federal acts, noting that they originated 
as the Ku Klux Act of 1871, which grew out of a message sent 
to Congress by President Grant on March 23, 1871, stating: 
"A condition of affairs now exists 
in some States of the Union rendering life 
and property insecure and the carrying of 
mails and the collection of the revenue 
dangerous. The proof that such a condition 
of affairs exists in some localities is now 
before the Senate. That the power to 
correct these evils is beyond the control 
of State authorities I do not doubt; that 
the power of the Executive of the United 
States, acting within the limits of existing 
laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is 
not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend 
such legislation as in the judgment of Congress 
shall effectually secure life, liberty, and 
property, and the enforcement of law in all 
parts of the United States. . . .•" Cong. 
Glode, 42 Congress., 1st Sess., p. 244. 
Justice Douglas identified three aims of Section 1983: 
(1) to override certain invidious laws which allegedly 
openly violated the rights or privileges of citizens of the 
United States; (2) to provide a remedy where state law was 
-5-
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inadequate; and (3) to provide a federal remedy where the 
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available 
in practice. Id., at 173-174. Nowhere in Monroe did the 
Supreme Court even hint that the federal civil rights acts 
were intended to create a new cause of action in state 
courts. To the contrary, it was intended to create a separate 
remedy in the federal courts where prior state remedies had 
failed. The Court cited numerous arguments of opponents of 
the 1871 Act who feared total federal takeover in this 
area. The Court noted that it was not the unavailability of 
state remedies but the failure of certain States to enforce 
the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful 
momentum behind the bill. 
Mr. Kerr of Indiana said: 
"This section gives to any person 
who may have been injured in any of his 
rights, privileges, or immunities of 
person or property, a civil action for 
damages against the wrongdoer in the 
Federal Courts. . . It is a covert attempt 
An example of this aim was given by Senator Sherman of 
Ohio in the legislative debates when he noted that condi-
tions existed in Kentucky where any offense could be 
committed upon a Negro by a white man and the Negro could 
not testify in any case against a white man. The Senator 
then concluded that "the only way by which any conviction 
can be had in Kentucky in those cases is in the United 
States courts. . . . " (Emphasis added.) Respondents submit 
that this is one of several statements of the Legislators 
viewing the Congressional legislation as creating a new 
cause of action to be commenced solely in the federal 
courts. 
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to transfer another large portion of 
jurisdiction from the State tribunals, 
to" which it of right belongs, to "those 
of the United States." Id. at 178-179. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Voorhees of Indiana said: 
"The first and second sections 
are designed to transfer all criminal 
jurisdiction from the courts of the 
States to the courts of the United 
States. This is to be done upon the 
assumption that the courts of the 
southern states fail and refuse to do 
their duty in the punishment of 
offenders against the law." Id., at 
179. 
Senator Thurman of Ohio said: 
"It authorizes any person who is 
deprived of any right, privilege, or 
immunity secured to him by the 
Constitution of the United States, to 
bring an action against the wrongdoer 
in the Federal courts . . . by this 
section jurisdiction of that civil 
action is given to the Federal courts 
instead of it being prosecuted as now in 
the courts of the States." 
~ ^ Thus, the above legislators clearly viewed the 1871 
Act as creating a new federal cause of action, with exclusive 
and original jurisdiction in the federal courts. Justice 
Douglas, in Monroe, summed up as follows: 
2 Black's Law Dictionary defines transfer as meaning "to 
convey or remove from one place, person, etc. to another; 
pass or hand over from one to another." 
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The debates were long and 
extensive. It is abundantly clear that 
one reason the legislation was passed 
was to afford a federal right in federal 
courts because, by reason of prejudice, 
passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, 
state laws might not be enforced and the 
claims of citizens to the enjoyment of 
rights, privileges, and immunities 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
might be denied by the state agencies„" 
Id. at 180. (Emphasis added.) 
Finally, in support of the view that the Congress of 1871 
intended to create a new cause of action to be brought solely 
in the federal forum, the original language of Section 1 of 
the bill was noted in Monroe and the language read as follows: 
". .. . such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district 
or circuit courts of the United States. . * ." Id. at 181. 
Respondents submit that the above historical analysis 
of Section 1983 clearly shows Congressional intent to create 
a cause of action solely in the federal forum. This is 
precisely the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee in Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 4 42 S.W«2d 24 8 
(.1969) . The Court was faced with the identical issue of the 
jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee to entertain cases 
predicated upon the federa.1 Civil Rights Acts, particularly 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1979, 1980, 1983, and 1985(e). The Court,like the 
Court in Monroe, examined in length the Congressional Records 
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pertinent to the above legislation and concluded as follows: 
11
. . . after considering the 
Congressional Records pertinent to 
this legislation which disclose its 
historical background, the temper 
of the times and climate of opinion 
held and expressed in this regard, we 
are firmly convinced that there is 
abundant indication that these statutes 
creating this action were directed to the 
federal trial forum, not the respective 
States." Id. at 250. 
The Tennessee Court also noted that the original language of 
the Act provided that such proceedings were to be "prosecuted 
in the several district or circuit courts of the United States." 
Id. at 251. The Court then held: 
"In view of the historical 
examination given R.S. § 1979 by 
the United States Supreme Court [in 
Monroe], and in the light of the 
interpretation given that section, 
it would be illogical indeed to hold 
that a State Court should enforce, 
or is required to enforce, an alleged 
cause of action which owes its very 
existence to congressional recogni-
tion of reluctance or refusal of 
State Courts to act." Id. at 252. 
The Court, however, took a dual approach to the issue excluding 
first that the state courts did not have jurisdiction to take 
such cases, and secondly, even if they had concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the states were not obligated to assume that jurisdiction. 
The Court said: 
-Q-
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"In any event, no policy of 
this State can be found in its 
history, judicial or otherwise, that 
would require the judicial branch of 
the government of Tennessee to enter-
tain such action." Id., at 250-251. 
The United States District Court of the Southern 
District of California, similarly addressed the issue and 
reached the following conclusion in Beauregard v. Wingard, 
230 F.Supp. 167 (1964) : 
"Plaintiff can have no action 
in a State court which is a counter-
part of the one before us, for Section 
1983 created an entirely new right, 
federal in origin, and cognizable only 
in a court of the United States." 
Id. at 185. 
The Court noted that a "new cause of action in the Federal 
Courts was created by the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 171. 
Defendants recognize the line of cases cited by 
appellant in support of a state taking jurisdiction of such 
cases, but submit that many of them are predicated upon a 
misreading of the United States Supreme Court decision of 
Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). 
The Dowd case focused on the issue whether a 
particular federal statute divested state courts of 
jurisdiction over suits involving alleged violations of 
contracts between employees and labor organizations. 
Certain statements contained in the Dowd decision, such 
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as the one cited by appellant at page 5 of his brief, are 
cited as authority for the proposition that state courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce rights created by m 
federal law unless the federal law expressly provides for 
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. However, it 
must be stressed that the Dowd Court was not addressing 
the issue of a state court taking concurrent jurisdiction 
over a case arising exclusively out of a federal statute. 
Instead, the Court was faced with the issue whether the 
federal statute divested the state courts of all juris-
diction (even under state law) of certain causes of action. 
The Dowd court cited Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 
353 U.S. 448, which stated that "state law if compatible with 
the purpose of § 301 (the federal statute) may be resorted 
to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate 
the federal policy . . . and any state law applied will be 
absorbed as federal law." 353 U.S. at 457. 
The Dowd Court later said, "to hold that § 301 
operates to deprive state courts of a substantial segment 
of their established jurisdiction over contract actions 
would disregard this history of hospitable acceptance of 
concurrent jurisdiction," (emphasis added) and that 
Congress in enacting § 301 did not intend to encroach upon 
-11-
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"the existing jurisdiction" of the state courts* 
Finally, after reviewing the legislative history of 
§ 301, the Court stated that the clear implication of 
the legislative history was that the purpose of 
conferring jurisdiction upon the federal courts was not 
to displace, but to supplement the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the various states over contracts made by 
i 
labor organizations, and to fill the gaps in the juris-
dictional law of some of the states, not to abolish 
existing state court jurisdiction. IcL at 512. 
Thus, those cases such as Brown v. Pitchess, 
531 P.2d 772 (1975) (cited by appellant) which rely upon 
Dowd as authority, have simply misread the case. The 
Supreme Court only held that § 301 did not divest state 
courts of any existing jurisdiction they had to entertain 
collective bargaining agreement lawsuits. The Court did 
4 
not say that state courts could entertain jurisdiction 
under § 301. The Court, to fill gaps in state law, 
merely gave federal courts jurisdiction over such actions 
so that the parties could seek a federal forum if they 
so desired. 
Two cases cited by appellant, Clark v. Bond Stores, 
340 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1973), and Luker v. Nelson, 341 F.Supp. Ill 
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(N.D. 111. 1972)
 f cited the case of Grubb v. Public 
Utilities Comm., 281 U.S. 470 (1930), as authority in 
concluding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
over suits brought under Section 1983. However, a close 
reading of Grubb reveals clear distinctions not addressed 
by the courts in Clark and Luker, and Grubb does not 
support the conclusions reached in those cases. In Grubb, 
the appellant had applied to the Public Utilities Commis-
sion of Ohio for a certificate to operate his motor buses 
over a certain route. The commission granted his request 
in part and denied it in part. Appellant then brought suit 
in federal district court alleging the commission's 
decision violated the commerce clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and a state 
statute. He also brought suit in the Supreme Court of 
Ohio which upheld the commission. The issue presented 
was whether the state supreme court decision operated as 
estoppel from bringing action in the federal district court. 
The Grubb Court noted that the laws of Ohio allowed review 
of commission orders and that appellant had indeed raised 
the commerce clause and Fourteenth Amendment claims in the 
state court as well as the alleged violation of the Ohio 
statute. The Court then held that state and federal courts 
-13-
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have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature 
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States, save in exceptional instances where the jurisdic-
tion has been restricted by Congress to the federal courts. 
Respondent submits that all Grubb stands for is the fact 
that the Ohio Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the 
commission order was invoked under Ohio law which expressly 
allowed such review of commission orders. It was not invoked 
under a federal jurisdictional statute (as is being attempted 
by Mr. Kish in the instant case). Grubb merely means that 
i 
once the Ohio Supreme Court had a jurisdictional basis 
in state law to review the commission's order, it could 
consider the issues arising under the commerce clause and the 
i 
Fourteenth Amendment, a position with which respondents do 
not disagree. Thus, there is a major difference between 
state courts considering federal questions in matters once 
I 
they have taken jurisdiction of a case under state law, as 
opposed to state courts taking jurisdiction of a case pursuant 
to a federal jurisdictional statute, which was initially 
4 
passed to create a federal forum to air civil rights complaints 
(as discussed supra). Indeed, such invades well-established 
notions of federalism and the Tenth Amendment of the United 
4 
States Constitution. This key distinction was totally missed by 
the courts in Clark and Luker, supra. 
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Finally, sound judicial policy and practicality 
provide additional grounds justifying a state court's refusal 
to entertain Section 1983 actions. Problems clearly arise 
with forum shopping and res judicata. For example, after the 
New York Court in Clark v. Bond Stores, supra, held that 
Section 1983 claims could be pursued in their state courts, 
a Pandora's box opened on an already burdened New Yori Court 
system, as is shown by a brief synopsis of Lombard v. Board of 
Education of the City of New York, et al., 502 F.2d 631 (1974). 
In the Lombard case, a teacher brought a civil action in state 
court against the board of education and his school principal 
challenging termination of his employment as a probationary 
teacher and his disqualification from teaching with a substi-
tute license. The state courts found against him and Lombard 
filed a Section 1983 claim in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York. That court dismissed 
Lombard's complaint, but the Second Circuit reversed, holding 
that prior state proceedings did not bar the civil rights suit 
on the grounds of res judicata or on collateral estoppel, since 
the federal court action was actually a procedural due process 
grievance, a constitutional argument not specifically advanced 
in the state court. 
Closer scrutiny of the ramifications of the Lombard 
decision shows the time-consuming, litigious realities of 
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opening the Section 1983 floodgates onto the Utah state 
court system. 
The defendants in Lombard argued that the state 
court judgment was res judicata as to Lombard's constitutional 
claims since he could have raised them in the state proceedings. 
Although the federal district court dismissed the action 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
i 
granted, the Second Circuit reversed, offering three policy 
reasons for not applying res judicata in this case. First, 
it argued that barring plaintiffs from litigating constitu-
tional claims which were not advanced in state court would be 
inconsistent with the ruling in Monroe v. Pape, supra, in 
that Section 1983 evinces a congressional determination to 
permit plaintiffs to enter a federal court without first 
. 3 
pursuing state judicial remedies. Second, the court suggested 
that plaintiffs should not be penalized for seeking redress in 
state court before bringing a federal Section 1983 action both 
because of the likelihood that the federal court would have 
abstained had the entire cause of action initially been 
I 
advanced in federal court (Lombard, at 635-636), and because 
3 Monroe v. Pape, supra at 183, wherein the United States 
Supreme Court stated: "It is no answer that the State has 
a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal 
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter 
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one 
is invoked." Digitize  by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of a perceived interest in not compelling plaintiffs "to 
seek constitutional redress in the state court or statutory 
construction in the federal court." Id. at 636. Third, 
the court reasoned that barring omitted constitutional claims 
would effectively extinguish those claims without then 
ever being heard, since the United States Supreme Court 
will only grant writs of certiorari to review state cmirt 
decisions when the constitutional issue was actually 
litigated below. 
Perhaps the Lombard court was really suggesting 
that the interest in judicial economy would be better served 
by splitting claims between federal and state courts leather 
than requiring the federal court to determine whether to 
abstain in each case since it concluded that compelling liti-
gation of both state and federal claims in one forum is 
undesirable. Indeed, such a claim-splitting approach might 
create inefficiency as it enables dissatisfied state litigants 
who initially had not contemplated asserting federal claims to 
bring 1983 actions. Consolidation of claims and application 
of res judicata would assure that in nearly all cases the 
factual issues are tried only once. 
However, if this Court determines that Section 1983 
actions may be pursued in state courts, it will have to 
recognize still another problem foisted on federal courts, 
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that applying res judicata and collateral estoppel to 
deny a full federal hearing to persons who did not elect 
the state forum would be inconsistent with the policies of 
the Civil Rights Act. Even defining an election can be a 
lengthy process, involving notions of defenses and counter-
claims as opposed to affirmative assertions, which of course 
may be voluntary or involuntary—perhaps a crucial factor. 
i 
What ought to be apparent from the foregoing 
judicial autopsy to this Court is that opening the state 
court doors to Section 19 83 claims will create more problems 
i 
than it could possibly solve. 
There are persuasive historical, legal and 
pragmatic arguments for concluding that Section 1983 suits 
i 
ought to remain in the federal courts. State courts already 
have crowded court calendars and the Lombard analysis 
demonstrates the potential complexities indiginous to a 
recognition of concurrent jurisdiction. The Congress created 
the Section 1983 action and explictly gave original jurisdic-
tion and explicitly gave exclusive jurisdiction to the federal 
district courts to adjudicate these claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the Section 1983 cause of action was 
especially created to fashion a new set of federal rights 
- i f f -
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for citizens denied their civil rights by persons acting 
under color of state law, and because concurrent jurisdiction 
of these claims would be an inefficient allocation of court 
responsibilities and raise numerous new problems for both 
state and federal courts, this Court ought to affirm Judge 
Snow's order of dismissal reaffirming and legitimizing the 
ordinary practice of filing Section 1983 actions in federal 
district court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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